

Lecture 7: Pseudo-Random Generators against BPP, and Interactive Proofs for the Permanent

Topics in Pseudorandomness and Complexity Theory (Spring 2017)
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1 Pseudo-Random Generator

Definition 1. A Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) against size s circuits is an algorithm to which we feed l bits to produce m bits that can fool a size s circuit. So $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ such that \forall Circuits C of size $\leq s$

$$\left| \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^l} [C(G(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \in \{0,1\}^m} [C(y) = 1] \right| < \epsilon$$

Remark. Why is such an algorithm G useful?

Because if we have a uniform algorithm PRG $G : \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{O}(\log m)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{O}(m)}$ against circuits of size $\leq \mathcal{O}(m)$, with error $\epsilon < 0.1$ then $P=BPP$.

To see why: say we are given an algorithm $A(x,r)$ that decides some fixed language $L \in BPP$, input $|x| = n$, randomness $|r| \leq n^c$ that runs in $\mathcal{O}(n^c)$. Now consider a circuit $C : \{0, 1\}^{|r|} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ on some fixed $z \in L$. So $C(r) = A(z,r)$, and C has size $\leq \mathcal{O}(n^c)$. Now using G with $m = n^c$, $\mathcal{O}(\log m) = \mathcal{O}(\log n)$ we know that

$$\left| \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^{\log m}} [C(G(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \in \{0,1\}^m} [C(y) = 1] \right| < 0.1$$

But since $L \in BPP$ the $\Pr[C(y) = 1] > \frac{2}{3}$ if $z \in L$ or $\Pr[C(y) = 1] < \frac{1}{3}$ if $z \notin L$

So finally $\Pr[C(G(x)) = 1] > 0.56$ and we can decide whether $z \in L$ (by taking majority as usual) in time $\mathcal{O}(m)$.

In other words, the PRG allows us to ensure that the majority output of $C(r)$ for a fixed z is correct.

Now we wish to find such a PRG.

Recall that last time we showed how to produce $l + 1$ random bits from a seed of length l . More precisely, given $f : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ we define $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{l+1}$ as $G(x) = (x, f(x))$. We showed that if f is $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ hard for circuits of size $\leq s$, then G is an ϵ -PRG against circuits of size $\leq as$ (for some small constant a).

Notice that this method can be used to make even more random bits: the first $l + 1$ bits are as before, the $l + 2^{\text{nd}}$ is $f(x_2, x_3, \dots, f(x))$, and so on recursively. BUT the size of the circuit against which this PRG works decays exponentially...

Theorem 2 (Nisan-Wigderson PRG). Given $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_m \subseteq [l]$, each $|s_i| = a$, and $f : \{0, 1\}^a \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ hard for circuits of size $\leq s$, then for $x \in \{0, 1\}^l$, $G(x) = (f(x|_{s_1}), f(x|_{s_2}), \dots, f(x|_{s_m}))$ is a $\mathcal{O}(m\epsilon)$ -PRG against circuits of size $\tilde{s} = \frac{1}{10}(s - 2^b m)$ for $b = \frac{2a^2}{l}$.

Proof. We will prove the theorem by contrapositive.
 Suppose $\exists \tilde{c}$ of size \tilde{s} that distinguishes the output of G , ie.

$$\left| \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^l} [\tilde{C}(G(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \in \{0,1\}^m} [\tilde{C}(y) = 1] \right| > m\epsilon$$

Now consider the hybrid distribution z .

$z_i = G(x)_1, G(x)_2, \dots, G(x)_i, y_{m-i}, \dots, y_m$ Note that $z_m = G(x)$ and $z_0 = y$.

So

$$|\Pr[\tilde{C}(G(x)) = 1] - \Pr[\tilde{C}(y) = 1]| > m\epsilon \implies |\Pr[\tilde{C}(z_m) = 1] - \Pr[\tilde{C}(z_0) = 1]| > m\epsilon$$

$$\implies \left| \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} (\Pr[\tilde{C}(z_{i+1}) = 1] - \Pr[\tilde{C}(z_i) = 1]) \right| > m\epsilon \text{ (telescoping sum)}$$

$$\implies \exists i \text{ such that } |\Pr[\tilde{C}(z_{i+1}) = 1] - \Pr[\tilde{C}(z_i) = 1]| > \epsilon \text{ (by pigeonhole)}$$

$$\implies \left| \Pr_{x,y} [\tilde{C}(f(x|_{s_1}), \dots, f(x|_{s_{i+1}}), y_{i+2}, \dots, y_m) = 1] - \right.$$

$$\left. \Pr_{x,y} [\tilde{C}(f(x|_{s_1}), \dots, f(x|_{s_i}), y_{i+1}, \dots, y_m) = 1] \right| > \epsilon$$

$$\implies \left| \mathbf{E}_{x, y_{i+1}, \dots, y_m} [\tilde{C}(\dots f(x|_{s_{i+1}}), y_{i+2} \dots) - \tilde{C}(\dots f(x|_{s_i}), y_{i+1} \dots)] \right| > \epsilon$$

So there is a fixed $y^* = y_{i+2}, \dots, y_m$ such that

$$\left| \mathbf{E}_{x, y_{i+1}} [\tilde{C}(\dots f(x|_{s_{i+1}}), y^*) - \tilde{C}(\dots f(x|_{s_i}), y_{i+1}, y^*)] \right| > \epsilon$$

So \tilde{C} is distinguishing the $i + 1^{\text{th}}$ bit.

Our plan now is that given $z \in \{0, 1\}^a$ to find $f(z)$ with probability $\geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ showing that f is not $\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon$ hard.

To do this we will create an $x \in \{0, 1\}^l$ such that $x|_{s_{i+1}} = z$

Let $u = x|_{s_{i+1}}$ and $v = x|_{s_{i+1}^c}$ so that $x = (u, v)$ and $u_j = u|_{s_j} = x|_{s_j \cap s_{i+1}}$ and $v_j = v|_{s_j} = x|_{s_j \cap s_{i+1}^c}$.

Note that $f(u_k, v_k) = f(x|_{s_k})$, and notably $f(u_{i+1}, v_{i+1}) = f(u) = f(z)$ So:

$$\left| \mathbf{E}_{u, v, y_{i+1}} [\tilde{C}(f(u_1, v_1), \dots, f(u_{i+1}, v_{i+1}), y^*) - \tilde{C}(f(u_1, v_1), \dots, f(u_i, v_i), y_{i+1}, y^*)] \right| > \epsilon$$

So there is a fixed v^* such that this holds. Let C' be the circuit such that

$C'(u, w) = \tilde{C}(f(u_1, v_{i+1}^*), \dots, f(u_i, v_{i+1}^*), w, y^*)$ for $u \in \{0, 1\}^a$, $w \in \{0, 1\}$

$$\implies \left| \mathbf{E}_{u, y_{i+1}} [C'(u, f(u)) - C'(u, y_{i+1})] \right| > \epsilon$$

Size of $C' \leq \mathcal{O}(\text{size}(\tilde{C} + m2^b)) = \mathcal{O}(\tilde{s} + m2^b)$

This means that we can distinguish $(u, f(u))$ from $(u, \text{random bit})$ so as we showed last class this means that $\exists c$ of size $\mathcal{O}(\tilde{s} + m2^b)$ such that

$$\Pr_u [C(u) = f(u)] > \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$$

□

We now move on to our major theorem...

Theorem 3 (Impagliazzo-Wigderson). *If \exists some function $f \in TIME(2^{\mathcal{O}(n)})$ such that circuits of size $2^{\delta n}$ cannot compute f , then $P=BPP$.*

Proof. 1. Hardness amplification:

$\exists f \in TIME(2^{\mathcal{O}(n)})$ hard for size $2^{\delta n} \implies \exists f \in TIME(2^{\mathcal{O}(n)})$ that is $(\frac{1}{2} - 2^{\epsilon n})$ hard for size $2^{\epsilon n}$ circuits.

2. Use this f in Nisan-Wigderson with $l = \frac{1}{2}n$, $a = n$, $b = \frac{\epsilon}{4}n$, $m = 2^{\frac{\epsilon}{4}n}$

So we get a $2^{\mathcal{O}(\epsilon n)}$ - PRG against size $2^{\mathcal{O}(\epsilon n)}$ circuits. So our PRG G takes in $\mathcal{O}(\log(m)) = \mathcal{O}(n)$ bits to m bits computable in $\text{poly}(n)$ time. \square

2 Interactive Proofs

Definition 4 (Permanent).

$$Perm : \mathbb{F}^{n \times n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}, Perm(m) = \sum_{\substack{\sigma_i[n] \rightarrow [n] \\ \text{permutations}}} \prod_{i=1}^n m_{i\sigma(i)}$$

(don't have efficient computation of $Perm(m)$)

Theorem 5 (Valiant). *The Permanent is #P-hard*

Definition 6 (NP proof system for L). *is an algorithm $V(X, \Pi)$, $|\Pi| \leq |X|^C$ and :*

If $X \in L$, $\exists \Pi$ such that $V(X, \Pi) \rightarrow ACCEPTS$

If $X \notin L$, $\forall \Pi$ such that $V(X, \Pi) \rightarrow REJECTS$

Definition 7 (Interactive proof for L). *is a randomized algorithm $V(X)$, which runs in time $|X|^C$ such that:*

$$\text{if } X \in L, \exists \text{ prover } P, \Pr_{\text{rand. of } V} (V(X) \text{ interacting with } PACCEPTS) \geq 0.99$$

$$\text{if } X \notin L, \forall \text{ provers } P, \Pr_{\text{rand. of } V} (V(X) \text{ interacting with } PACCEPTS) \leq 0.01$$

Theorem 8. *There \exists an interactive proof for coSAT (set of unsatisfiable boolean formulae).*

Theorem 9. *There \exists an interactive proof for the value of the permanent, over \mathbf{F}_q .*

Theorem 9 implies theorem 8 by Valiant (there is a matrix whose $Perm = \#$ of satisfying assignments = 0)

Proof. Let $N_{ij} = \text{minor}_{ij}(m) \rightarrow Perm(m) = \sum_{i=1}^n m_{ij} \times Perm(N_{ij})$

So $Perm(m)$ can be computed from $Perm(N_{ij})_{i=1}^n$

We have matrices $N_{11}, \dots, N_{1n} \in \mathbf{F}_q^{(n-1) \times (n-1)}$

For $q \gg n^{10}$, let $m = n - 1$

Let $q(T) \in (\mathbf{F}_q(T))^{m \times m} \rightarrow$ this represents a curve.

Pick $q(T)$ unique of degree $n - 1$ subject to $q(1) = N_1, q(2) = N_2, \dots, q(T)$ is a matrix of polynomials.

Verifier sends $q(T)$ to prover.

Prover gives $\text{Perm}(q(T)) \in \mathbf{F}_q(T)$ of degree $\leq n \times m$

Verifier checks that $\sum_{j=1}^m m_{ij}N(j) = \text{Perm}(m) = h(T)$

Verifier picks $t \in \mathbf{F}_q$ uniformly at random and asks prover to prove that $h(t) = \text{Perm}(q(t))$

Take an arbitrary prover.

Case 1: $h(t)$ is correct, everything is good...

Case 2: $h(t)$ is wrong, then $h(t) \neq \text{Perm}(q(T)) \implies$ they are distinct polynomials. Then

$$\Pr_t(h(t) = \text{Perm}(q(t))) \leq \frac{mn}{q} \leq \frac{n^2}{q} \leq \frac{1}{n^8}$$

So with probability $\geq 1 - \frac{1}{n^8}$ we have to prove a wrong statement in the next round. So in n rounds (we are reducing n to $(n-1)$ to $(n-2)$ minors etc...), probability of cheating prover gets away $\leq n \frac{1}{n^8} = \frac{1}{n^7}$

□