

- (1) A staircase of n steps contains coins on some of the steps. Let (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) denote the position with x_j coins on step j , $j = 1, \dots, n$. A move of *Staircase Nim* consists of moving any positive number of coins from any step, j , to the next lower step, $j-1$. Coins reaching the ground (step 0) are removed from play. A move taking, say, x chips from step j , where $1 \leq x \leq x_j$, and putting them on step $j-1$, leaves $x_j - x$ coins on step j and results in $x_{j-1} + x$ coins on step $j-1$. The game ends when all coins are on the ground. Players alternate moves and the last to move wins.

Show that the SG-function of a position (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) in the Staircase Nim is equal to the Nim-sum of the numbers of coins at the odd positions: $x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus \dots \oplus x_{2k_1}$, where $k = \frac{n+1}{2}$ if n is odd and $k = \frac{n}{2}$ if n is even.

20 points

continued on page 3

- (2) Player I draws a card at random from a full deck of 52 cards. After looking at the card, he bets either 1 or 3 that the card he drew is a face card (king, queen or jack, probability $3/13$). Then Player II either concedes or doubles. If she concedes, she pays I the amount bet (no matter what the card was). If she doubles, the card is shown to her, and Player I wins twice his bet if the card is a face card, and loses twice his bet otherwise.
- (a) Draw the Kuhn tree.
 - (b) Find the equivalent strategic form.
 - (c) Solve the game.

20 points

continued on page 4

continued on page 5

- (3) Find the safety levels, maxmin strategies, and all Nash Equilibria for the game given in the matrix form by the following bi-matrix.

$$\begin{pmatrix} (1, 4) & (2, 7) & (3, 2) & (2, 6) \\ (5, 2) & (0, 3) & (4, 3) & (6, 1) \\ (2, 3) & (3, 4) & (5, 2) & (3, 5) \end{pmatrix}$$

20 points

continued on page 6

continued on page 7

(4) Consider a two-person cooperative game given by the following matrix

$$\begin{pmatrix} (2, 0) & (3, -3) & (2, -1) & (10, -9) & (0, 0) \\ (7, 5) & (3, 1) & (3, 2) & (2, 1) & (-1, 2) \\ (2, 3) & (0, 0) & (1, 1) & (4, 5) & (-1, 4) \\ (-1, 0) & (8, 7) & (5, 6) & (3, 2) & (-1, 5) \end{pmatrix}.$$

- (a) Find all Pareto-optimal strategies
- (b) Solve the game as a TU game.
- (c) Find a λ -transfer solution assuming it is an NTU game.

20 points

continued on page 8

continued on page 9

- (5) Consider a weighted majority game with four players with the weights 5, 10, 10, 22.
- (a) Compute the Shapley-Shubik power index.
 - (b) Find the Nucleolus.

20 points

continued on page 10

Total Marks = 100 points